SPAC Transactions: Governing a Route That Changed Underneath the Market
For a stretch of 2020 and 2021, the special purpose acquisition company looked like an unusually good deal for a clinical-stage biopharma company. The pitch had three parts. It was faster and more certain than a traditional IPO. It delivered a defined pool of capital sitting in trust. And — the part that mattered most for a company with no revenue — it allowed the target to present forward-looking financial projections to investors in a way a conventional IPO did not.
That third element was the real draw. A pre-revenue company trying to explain its value through an IPO prospectus is limited in how it can characterize a future it has not yet reached. A de-SPAC, as the market understood the rules at the time, let the company show investors what management believed the product could become.
Two of those three advantages have substantially eroded. The volume of these transactions collapsed after 2021, and in 2024 the SEC adopted rules specifically designed to make the de-SPAC route resemble a traditional IPO in its disclosure obligations and, more pointedly, in its liability. A board being presented with a SPAC proposal today is being offered something materially different from what the pitch deck's precedents describe.
This article is about governing that decision as it now stands.
(This article is governance guidance, not legal advice. Securities rules and market practice in this area have moved considerably and continue to; any board evaluating a de-SPAC should be working from current advice of securities counsel.)
What Changed
The SEC adopted final rules on SPACs and de-SPAC transactions in January 2024, by a narrow vote, effective that July. Three changes matter most at board level.
The target company became a co-registrant. In a registered de-SPAC, the private operating company is now treated as a co-registrant on the registration statement alongside the SPAC. The practical consequence is that the target and its directors and officers sign that registration statement and take on liability under the Securities Act for its contents. The regulator's reasoning was straightforward: most of the disclosure in a de-SPAC registration statement is about the target, and the target is the principal beneficiary of the capital the SPAC raised.
For a board, this is the single most important change. Directors of the private company are no longer approving a transaction in which someone else's registration statement describes them. They are signing it.
The projections advantage largely disappeared. The rules amended the definition of blank check company to encompass SPACs for purposes of the statutory safe harbor for forward-looking statements, making that safe harbor unavailable. Projections in a de-SPAC now sit outside the protection the market had previously assumed applied to them, and new disclosure requirements govern how projections must be presented when used. De-SPAC transactions are, in this respect, now treated like traditional IPOs — where the safe harbor has never been available.
Projections have not been prohibited. Most de-SPAC registration statements continue to include target projections where the SPAC's board considered them in approving the transaction. What has gone is the liability shield.
Underwriter exposure broadened. The SEC declined to adopt a proposed rule that would have automatically deemed SPAC IPO underwriters to be underwriters in the subsequent de-SPAC. Instead it issued guidance that the statutory definition already reaches anyone who sells for the issuer or participates in the distribution, and separately confirmed through rulemaking that a de-SPAC constitutes a distribution of securities. The effect is to put participants on notice that underwriter status — and the diligence obligations and liability that accompany it — may attach.
Why This Lands Hardest on Clinical-Stage Companies
The 2024 rules are general, but their effect is not evenly distributed, and a pre-revenue biopharma company sits at the point of maximum impact.
A company with revenue and a trading history can describe itself largely through historical fact. A clinical-stage company cannot. Its value rests entirely on what its assets might become, which means the investor case is necessarily forward-looking: projected trial outcomes, projected approval, projected launch timing, projected pricing and uptake. The ability to present that case was the specific reason the de-SPAC route appealed to this sector.
That case is now presented without safe-harbor protection, in a registration statement the company's own directors sign.
Worse, biopharma projections are unusually fragile. A revenue forecast for an operating business is an extrapolation from something real. A revenue forecast for a clinical-stage asset is a chain of conditional probabilities — the trial reads out positively, the regulator accepts the package, the label is broad enough, payers reimburse at something near the assumed price, uptake follows the modeled curve. Each link can break, and when one does, the gap between what was projected and what happened can be enormous and highly visible.
A board approving such a document should understand that it is attesting to disclosure built on a long contingency chain, without the protection the market previously assumed, in a sector where projections miss routinely and where securities litigation following a disappointing clinical outcome is a well-established pattern.
None of that makes the route unusable. It does mean the board's engagement with the projections — how they were built, what assumptions drive them, how they are characterized and caveated in the document — is no longer a matter of presentation. It is the board's own exposure.
The Cash Is Not the Cash
Separately from the regulatory changes, the structural feature that most often surprises boards is redemption.
A SPAC's trust holds a stated amount, and that figure anchors every conversation. But SPAC shareholders have the right to redeem their shares for their pro-rata share of the trust rather than participate in the combination. In the wave of transactions that followed the boom, redemption rates were frequently very high, and companies that announced deals with substantial trust figures closed with a fraction of that cash.
The trust amount is therefore a ceiling, not a floor, and a board that evaluates the transaction on the headline figure has evaluated a scenario that may not occur. The practical governance questions are what the company's position looks like under high-redemption scenarios, whether a committed PIPE or other backstop financing fills the gap, how reliable that commitment is and what conditions attach to it, and whether the agreement contains a minimum-cash condition permitting the company to walk away if proceeds fall below a workable level.
That last point deserves emphasis. A minimum-cash condition is the board's protection against completing a transaction that leaves the company public, newly burdened with public-company costs, and underfunded — which is a worse position than remaining private. Boards should know whether that condition exists, where it is set, and who can waive it.
Sponsor Economics and the Deadline
The SPAC sponsor's incentives deserve direct board attention, because they are not the target's and they intensify over time.
A sponsor typically holds founder shares acquired on terms very different from those available to public investors — the promote — which converts into a meaningful stake in the combined company. That stake dilutes everyone else, and its effect on the post-close cap table should be modeled explicitly rather than absorbed as a structural given.
More importantly, a SPAC operates against a deadline. If it fails to complete a combination within its permitted window, it generally must liquidate and return the trust to shareholders, and the sponsor's promote becomes worthless. This produces a powerful asymmetry: as the deadline approaches, the sponsor's interest in completing a transaction can diverge sharply from any view about whether this transaction is good.
A target board negotiating in the final months of a SPAC's life has leverage it may not recognize, and is also dealing with a counterparty whose enthusiasm may reflect the calendar rather than the merits. The board should know where in its life cycle the SPAC sits, what extensions have been obtained and at what cost, and how much of the counterparty's urgency is structural.
The enhanced disclosure requirements adopted in 2024 address much of this — sponsor compensation, conflicts, and dilution now require specific disclosure, and the rules contemplate disclosure concerning the SPAC board's determination about the transaction. Those requirements help investors. They do not relieve the target's board of understanding the dynamics for itself.
You Still Become a Public Company
The most consistent governance failure in this area is treating the de-SPAC as a transaction rather than as a transition.
A company that completes a de-SPAC is a public company the following day, subject to periodic reporting on statutory deadlines, executive certification of financial statements, internal control over financial reporting, disclosure controls, exchange listing standards with their independence and committee requirements, and the full apparatus of being accountable to a public shareholder base.
The readiness work that a conventional IPO process forces a company to complete over many months — recruiting independent directors, building a finance function that can report on a public timetable, establishing controls, instilling disclosure discipline — still has to happen. The de-SPAC timeline frequently compresses it, and the transaction's speed is often precisely what attracted the company. The result can be a newly public company whose governance infrastructure is nominal, now carrying co-registrant liability from day one.
Boards should treat the readiness checklist as a precondition rather than a post-closing project, and should be honest about whether the organization can be ready on the proposed timetable. If it cannot, that is an argument about the timetable, not a detail to be managed later.
The Questions a Board Should Ask
What do our directors become personally responsible for by signing? Asked of counsel directly, and answered specifically rather than reassuringly.
How were the projections built, and would we defend each assumption publicly? Including what happens to the disclosure if the next data readout disappoints.
What does this look like at seventy or ninety percent redemption? Modeled, with the financing that fills the gap identified and its conditions understood.
Is there a minimum-cash condition, where is it set, and who can waive it?
What does the promote do to our cap table, and what do our existing holders own afterward?
Where is this SPAC in its life, and how much of the counterparty's urgency is the deadline?
Can we actually operate as a public company on this timeline? Asked of the CFO, and then tested against someone who has done it.
What are the alternatives, honestly compared? A private round, a partnership, a sale, or a conventional IPO later — each evaluated at its realistic value rather than against the de-SPAC's headline.
The Traps
Relying on precedent transactions from before mid-2024. The liability framework changed. Deals that closed under the prior understanding are not a guide to what the board is now signing.
Treating projections as marketing. They are disclosure, they now lack the safe harbor, and the directors sign the document containing them.
Planning around the trust figure. It is the best case, and in this market frequently not the realistic one.
Underestimating the sponsor's deadline pressure — or failing to use it. It is both a warning about the counterparty's motives and a source of the target's negotiating leverage.
Deferring the governance build-out. The obligations attach at closing whether or not the company is ready.
Choosing the route for speed alone. Speed was always the honest advantage, and it remains real. But speed into public-company obligations without readiness is not a shortcut; it is a deferred cost with interest.
The Underlying Principle, and the Close of the Pillar
A de-SPAC is a legitimate route to the public markets, and for some companies in some conditions it is the right one. What it is not, and has never been, is a way to become public without becoming a public company. The 2024 rules made that explicit by attaching to the target and its directors much of the responsibility that a conventional IPO has always imposed — and by removing the protection around the projections that were the route's distinctive appeal to pre-revenue companies.
The board's task is therefore to evaluate the transaction on what it actually delivers now: realistic net proceeds after redemption rather than the trust headline, a cap table that reflects the promote, a disclosure document its own directors are signing, and an organization that must function as a public company immediately.
This closes the pillar on capital and strategic transactions, and the thread running through all of it is visible here in concentrated form. Financings, sales, partnerships, bridges, earn-outs, insider rounds and public listings each arrive with a headline number and a story about what the company is getting. In nearly every case the board's real work is the same: find out what is actually being received, identify who at the table benefits differently from everyone else, understand what the company is committing to after the moment of signing, and make sure the protections that matter are secured while there is still leverage to secure them. The transactions differ. The discipline does not.