Biopharma Board Governance
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Milestone Payments and Earn-Outs: Governing Value You No Longer Control

|Lawrence Fine

In biopharma M&A, a great deal of the consideration is contingent. Development, regulatory, and commercial milestones, often packaged as contingent value rights, routinely account for more of a deal's headline value than the cash paid at closing. A board approving such a transaction is approving a structure in which much of what the shareholders are supposedly receiving will be determined years later.

The valuation question — what is that contingent value actually worth, risk-adjusted — belongs to the decision whether to sell at all. This article is about something else: what happens after signing. Because the defining feature of contingent consideration is that the selling shareholders hand the asset to a buyer who will then decide how hard to pursue it, how to prioritize it against everything else in their portfolio, and whether to continue at all — while the sellers have dispersed, hold no operational role, and possess only the rights the agreement gave them.

The litigation that follows these deals is instructive on exactly this point. The disputes are rarely about arithmetic. They are about who ran the program afterward, what they did, and how hard they were obliged to try.

(This article is governance guidance, not legal advice. The Delaware case law in this area has moved meaningfully in recent years, and any board negotiating contingent consideration should be working from current advice of transaction counsel.)


The Structural Asymmetry

Once a deal closes, the position of the selling shareholders is unusually weak, and boards should understand how weak before they agree to put value there.

The buyer controls the program entirely: its funding, its staffing, its priority relative to competing internal assets, its regulatory strategy, and the decision whether to terminate it. The buyer also controls nearly all of the information about how it is being run. The former shareholders are typically represented by a single stockholder representative — an entity with limited resources acting for a dispersed group — whose practical ability to detect a problem depends on reporting rights negotiated before closing, and whose ability to litigate depends on a funded expense reserve that someone remembered to establish.

Meanwhile the buyer has a structural incentive that does not need to be sinister to be real. Every dollar of milestone payment is a cost. A program competing for resources inside a large organization against assets that carry no such payment obligation is competing on uneven terms, and the people making portfolio decisions are not usually thinking about the sellers at all. The asset simply loses internal arguments.

That is the situation the agreement has to anticipate. The board's leverage over it exists entirely at the negotiating table and disappears at closing.


Efforts Standards: Where the Real Terms Live

The provision that governs all of this is the efforts standard — the covenant describing how hard the buyer must work to achieve the milestones. In practice this clause, and not the milestone definitions, is where most of the economic risk sits.

The phrase "commercially reasonable efforts" has no settled meaning. Delaware courts interpret it according to how the particular agreement defines it, and the drafting choices produce materially different obligations.

An inward-facing standard measures the buyer against its own practice — for example, the efforts it customarily applies to its own priority products of similar commercial potential at a similar stage in the lifecycle. Delaware's Supreme Court construed such a provision in early 2026 and reached a conclusion sellers should find encouraging: where an agreement lists factors the buyer may take into account, those qualifiers are cabined. They permit the buyer to choose among reasonable paths toward a milestone; they do not permit it to deprioritize the earn-out in favor of other business interests. The court affirmed the finding that the buyer had breached that obligation.

An outward-facing standard measures the buyer against a hypothetical company similarly situated — what a typical firm with comparable resources and expertise would do with a product like this one. Chancery applied this construction in a pharmaceutical case involving a terminated program, assessing more than ten contractual factors and concluding that terminating the development program fell short of the standard. Notably, the buyer's own internal assessments of the product's market potential were used as evidence against it.

Each construction has trade-offs. An inward-facing standard ties the obligation to the buyer's actual practices, which can be documented and compared — useful where the buyer is a large, systematic organization, and it avoids having the buyer judged against an abstraction. An outward-facing standard protects against a buyer whose own practices are poor or whose priorities shift. Neither is universally better, and the useful insight for a board is simply that this is a negotiated choice with consequences, not boilerplate.

What matters more than the choice is specificity. The disputes that sellers win are the ones where the agreement defined the standard in detail and enumerated what the buyer could and could not consider. One provision worth knowing about appeared in a recent case: the agreement expressly prohibited the buyer from taking the cost of the milestone payments into account when making development decisions. That single sentence directly addresses the structural incentive described above, and a board negotiating contingent consideration should ask whether its agreement contains something equivalent.


What the Courts Will Not Do for You

Boards sometimes comfort themselves that even if the drafting is imperfect, a buyer behaving badly will be held to account through general principles of good faith. Recent Delaware law has narrowed that assumption considerably, and the direction of travel favors buyers.

The implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing cannot alter or override express contractual terms. It applies only where there is a genuine gap — a truly unanticipated development the agreement did not address. In the 2026 Supreme Court decision, the FDA closed the specific regulatory pathway on which a milestone had been expressly conditioned. Chancery had held that the buyer was required by the implied covenant to pursue an alternative pathway instead. The Supreme Court reversed that holding: because the contract had conditioned the milestone on a specific route to approval, it had allocated the risk that the route might become unavailable, and there was no gap for the covenant to fill.

The practical lesson is sharp. If a milestone is tied to a particular regulatory pathway, and that pathway closes, the loss may fall on the sellers — not because the buyer did anything wrong, but because the agreement assigned that risk by naming the pathway.

A Chancery decision in 2026 reinforced the same theme from another direction, largely dismissing earn-out claims where the agreement granted the buyer full discretion. With discretion expressly conferred, there was no gap. The court observed that while the implied covenant might prohibit a buyer from intentionally undermining a business to avoid earn-out payments, it does not require a buyer to do everything it can to increase them.

And in an earlier dispute, a buyer that terminated development altogether was found not to have breached its efforts obligation, on that agreement's particular definition.

Taken together: good faith is a narrow backstop, not a substitute for drafting. The protections a board wants have to be written down.


Milestone Definitions

Given that courts will enforce what the agreement says, the definitions deserve more board attention than they usually receive.

Specificity cuts both ways. A precisely defined milestone is harder to dispute, but it also allocates the risk of the specified route failing. Naming a regulatory pathway, a particular trial design, a specific indication, or a defined endpoint makes achievement objectively testable and simultaneously means that if circumstances change, the sellers may simply lose. Where a milestone must be specific, the board should consider whether the agreement also provides for substitution or adjustment if the specified route becomes unavailable for reasons outside anyone's control.

Achievability under the buyer's control. A milestone that depends on decisions the buyer makes — filing timing, trial initiation, commercial launch — is different in kind from one that depends on an external event. The more the achievement depends on buyer discretion, the more the efforts covenant has to carry.

Commercial milestones are the most fragile. Sales thresholds depend on pricing, reimbursement, promotional investment, and portfolio positioning, all controlled by the buyer and all legitimately adjustable for reasons unrelated to the earn-out. They are also the furthest out in time, when institutional memory of the deal has faded.

Timing windows. A milestone achievable only within a fixed period transfers delay risk to the sellers. Development slips; a window that leaves no margin may be worth little.


Monitoring Rights: The Half Boards Forget

A right to a payment is worth very little without the ability to know whether it has been earned. Yet reporting and audit provisions are routinely treated as administrative detail and negotiated last, by which point attention has moved on.

A board should want, at a minimum: periodic written reporting on the program's status and the efforts applied to it; the right to request information and to audit records relevant to milestone achievement; a defined process and timetable for determining whether a milestone has been met, with a mechanism for the sellers to dispute a negative determination; and notice obligations if the buyer intends to terminate, deprioritize, divest, or sublicense the program.

That last item matters because an asset can be transferred onward. The board should understand what happens to the milestone obligations if the buyer sells the program or is itself acquired — whether the obligations bind successors, and whether the efforts standard travels with the asset.

Equally practical: who represents the former shareholders, what authority they hold, and whether they are funded. A stockholder representative without an adequately sized expense reserve cannot realistically investigate a suspected breach, let alone litigate one against a counterparty with far greater resources. Establishing that reserve is a decision made at signing, and it is frequently undersized because nobody at the table wants to budget for conflict on a day everyone is optimistic.


The Board's Position at Signing

This is where the governance point lands. A board approving a transaction with substantial contingent consideration is binding shareholders to an arrangement they will have no ability to influence and limited ability to monitor. The shareholders will be dispersed; many will have moved on entirely. Whatever protections exist will be the ones the board secured before closing.

That argues for treating the contingent portion as a live negotiation rather than as a sweetener that improves the headline. Concretely, it means the board should understand the efforts standard and how it is defined, should ask what the agreement prohibits the buyer from considering, should know what happens if a specified regulatory route closes, should confirm there are real reporting and audit rights, and should ensure the stockholder representative is funded to act.

It also argues for honest internal accounting. If the board concludes that the contingent consideration is weakly protected, that is not a reason to abandon the deal — it is a reason to discount it heavily in deciding whether the deal is better than the alternatives. A structure that is worth less than its headline should be compared against those alternatives at its real value, not its advertised one.


The Traps

Treating the efforts clause as boilerplate. It is the single most consequential provision in the contingent structure and frequently receives the least board attention.

Relying on good faith to cover drafting gaps. Delaware has made clear the covenant fills genuine gaps only and cannot override express terms or an express grant of discretion.

Naming a regulatory pathway without a fallback. This can silently allocate to sellers the risk that the pathway disappears.

Underfunding the stockholder representative. A right nobody can afford to enforce is not much of a right.

Negotiating monitoring provisions last. By then, the attention and the leverage are both gone.

Letting the headline number into the board's own reasoning. The total announced is not the value delivered, and a board that has internally discounted the contingent portion should ensure its decision-making reflects that discount rather than the press release.


The Underlying Principle

Contingent consideration is a reasonable response to genuine uncertainty. When buyer and seller disagree about what an asset will become, structuring part of the price around what actually happens is sensible, and these structures frequently pay.

But they relocate a large share of the consideration into a period when the selling shareholders have no control, limited information, and only contractual rights. Everything that protects them is decided in the weeks before closing, by a board that will not be there to enforce it, on behalf of shareholders who will have no voice at all.

That is why the efforts standard, the milestone definitions, the reporting rights, and the representative's funding deserve board-level attention rather than deferral to the documents. The disputes that follow these transactions almost never turn on whether a number was calculated correctly. They turn on how hard someone was required to try — and the answer to that was written down, or was not, years earlier.

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